

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 09-15-2017 BY J75J65T61 ADG

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

September 19, 1955

William F. Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General  
Internal Security Division

JOSEPH ALSOP  
"THE WASHINGTON POST AND  
TIMES HERALD" ARTICLE ENTITLED  
"THE KILLIAN REPORT" IN  
SEPTEMBER 19, 1955 ISSUE  
ESPIONAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to an article that appeared in "The Washington Post and Times Herald" on September 19, 1955, entitled, "The Killian Report" by Joseph Alsop.

It is hereby requested that the officials of the appropriate government agencies be interviewed in order to determine whether the information appearing in the above-mentioned article is a security violation and, if so, it is also requested that you ascertain the following:

- (1) What are the exact statements that contain classified information?
- (2) Is the published data accurate?
- (3) Is the published data classified properly?
- (4) Can the published data be declassified for purposes of prosecution and, if so, what is the name of the person competent to testify concerning classification?
- (5) What is the extent of dissemination, officially, of the classified data?
- (6) Has the data been subject to prior official releases?
- (7) Has declassification of the data been decided upon prior to publication?
- (8) Did the classified data come from a specific document, and if so, what is the origin of the document?
- (9) What is the name of the individual who is responsible for the security of the published classified information?
- (10) Has the material, portions thereof, or enough background data been previously published, officially, or in the press in order to make educated speculation on the matter possible?
- (11) Was clearance for publication sought from proper authorities prior to publication?

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Upon receipt of this information, this Division will advise you whether any further action is warranted in this matter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
SEP 19 1955	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

*Graham*

*Orig. Boundless*

DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

9/21/64

SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

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JOSEPH W. ALSOP

[REDACTED]  
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and four copies of LHM setting forth information concerning subject's contemplated travel behind the Iron Curtain between November and December, 1964.

[REDACTED]

The LHM is classified "~~Confidential~~" because it reveals [REDACTED] and because it reveals the existence of confidential informants of continuing value.

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The above data is being furnished the Bureau for whatever dissemination is deemed advisable. No further action is being taken in this matter by WFO.

CONSOLIDATED

SEP 24 1971

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Initials: ALP

*R. Root*  
2- Bureau (Encs. 5)

(5) WFO

(1- [REDACTED])  
(1- 100-18807) [REDACTED]  
(1- [REDACTED])  
(1- 100-382)

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100-18807-12

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Indexed \_\_\_\_\_  
Filed \_\_\_\_\_

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File No.  - 1A'

Date Received 9-21-55

From David Z. Beckler,

(Name of Contributor)

OFFICE OF Defense Mobilization  
(Address of Contributor)

By

Carl E. Graham

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned

Yes ( )  
No (X)

Description:

Dup copy of ~~classified~~  
document receipt

(memo from David Z Beckler  
to SA Graham dated 9/21/55  
which has been made a  
serial in instant report)

Form ODM-14  
(May 1951)

# CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT RECEIPT

(DUPLICATE)

DATE

9/21/55

DOCUMENT NO.

Executive Office of the President  
Office of Defense Mobilization  
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 09-15-2017 BY J75J65T61 ADG

TITLE OR OTHER IDENTIFICATION:

Memo from Beckler to Graham  
re Questions regarding Alsop Column on the Killian Rpt.

NO. OF ENCLOSURE(S)

Orig. & 1 copy

NO. OF COPIES

ADDRESSEE

Mr. Carl Graham  
FBI (WFO)

*Carl E. Graham* FBI WFO

NOTE.—Duplicate (Addressee's copy) to be retained by addressee.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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Airtel

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. September 19, 1955

Transmit the following message to: SAC, Washington Field (Enclosure - 1)

JOSEPH ALSOP  
"THE WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES HERALD"  
ARTICLE ENTITLED "THE KILLIAN REPORT"  
IN 9/19/55 ISSUE  
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 09-15-2017 BY J75J65T61 ADG

Enclosed is a copy Department memorandum 9/19/55 in instant matter. For your info "The Killian Report" carries caption "Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee." It is dated 2/14/55 and was prepared as result of suggestions made by the President to the Science Advisory Committee under the Office of Defense Mobilization. Chairman of Committee was Mr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This report has been of a ~~Top Secret~~ nature since its inception. Immediately institute investigation requested in instant enclosure. This matter must be given top priority and Bureau advised of important developments by air-tel. Initial report must be at Bureau by 9/26/55.

HOOVER

ADDENDUM

Mr. C. E. HENNRICH, of the Bureau, called at 5:50 P.M., 9/19/55, and stated that every person interviewed in connection with this matter should be told that we are making the investigation and conducting the interview at the request of Assistant Attorney General TOMPKINS, who is head of the Internal Security Division of the Department. Mr. HENNRICH further instructed that ALSOP should not be interviewed without prior Bureau authority.

L. L. LAUGHLIN  
SAC

FILE STRIPPED

SEP 24 1955  
Date:

Initials: JEP

SENT VIA

M

Per

*John C. P. [unclear]*

*9/20/55*

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TCP REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1955

Volumes I and II -- The first printing of the report was in two volumes.

*(25 each made)  
(25 each sets)*

Series A -- Consolidation of Volumes I and II into one volume.

*75 printed*

Series B -- Rerun of Series A with certain minor corrections.

*51 printed*

White House (3)

\* 2 copies of Volumes I and II to Colonel Goodpaster -- One set for the President *3/18/55. (3-18-55)*

1 copy of Series B to Commander Beach *3/18/55*

Vice President (1)

1 copy of Series B, via S. Everett Gleason, NSC *3/18/55*

Special Assistant to the President (1)

1 copy of Series B to Nelson Rockefeller *3/18/55*

[redacted]

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\* 2 copies of Volumes I and II (General Cutler and Mr. Sprague) *3/23/55. 2/15/55*

1 copy of Series B to each of the following: Robert Cutler; James S. Lay, Jr.; J. Patrick Coyne; Marion W. Boggs; S. Everett Gleason; Executive Officer, OCB, via Mr. Staats; and Chairman, ICIS. *(all 3/18/55.)*

[redacted] *operations coordinating board, NSC*

(7)

*Interdepartmental Committee on Int Sec.*

\* 1 copy of Volumes I and II to the Director *(2/28/55)*

1 copy of Series B to the Director, via Mr. Amory *3/18/55*

\* 5 copies of Series B to H. M. Chadwell *3/31/55*

[redacted] *(5)*

\* 1 copy of Volumes I and II to the Chairman *(2/28/55)*

1 copy of Series B to the Chairman, via Commander Nelson *3/18/55*

\* 1 copy of Series B to Dr. John Von Neumann (This copy was returned 3/23/55)

\* 3 copies to the Chairman *Series B. about 6/55.*

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*Graham*

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Department of Defense (66)

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
OSD (51)

- \* 6 copies of Volumes I and II to Mr. Quarles - 2/18/55 *assist Sec for*
- \* 5 copies of Series A to Mr. Quarles. (2/21/55) - *(R & D Protocols)*
- \* 1 copy of Series A to Mr. Wilson - 2/25/55
- \* 20 copies of Series A to Mr. Quarles 3/4/55.
- \* 15 copies of Series A to Mr. Quarles 3/11/55
- 4 copies of Series B to the Secretary, via General Bonesteel 3/18/55.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
JCS (6)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Chairman, via General Gerhart 3/18/55
- 5 copies of Series B to JCS, via Captain Hutchinson 3/18/55.

ARMY (2)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Colonel McCrory 3/18/55
- 1 copy of Series B to Army Chief of Staff 3/18/55

NAVY (3)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Captain Adams 3/18/55
- 1 copy of Series B to the Chief of Naval Operations 3/18/55
- \* 1 copy of Series B to Dr. E. R. Piore, Office of Naval Research 3/17/55.

AIR FORCE (3)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Colonel Kinney 3/18/55
- 1 copy of Series B to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Air 3/18/55
- \* 1 copy of Series B to Lt. Gen. Harold L. George, Office, Chief of Staff, USAF  
*Apr 20/55*

MARINE CORPS (1)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Commandant, via Colonel Wade 3/18/55

*Dept of*  
STATE (3)

\* 1 copy of Volumes I and II to the Secretary (3/4/55)

1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Mr. Bowie 3/18/55.

1 copy of Series B to the Under Secretary, via Mr. Bishop 3/18/55

FEDA (2) *Federal  
Civil Defense Administration*

\* 1 copy of Series A to the Administrator 3/7/55

1 copy of Series B to the Administrator, via Mr. Spear 3/18/55

*Dept 3*  
JUSTICE (1)

1 copy of Series B to the Attorney General, via Barrett McDonald 3/18/55

FBI (1)

*Interdepartmental  
Intelligence Conference*

1 copy of Series B to the Chairman, IIC (J. Edgar Hoover) 3/18/55

*Dept 3* TREASURY (1)

1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Mr. Rose 3/18/55

FOA (1) *Foreign Operations Administration*

1 copy of Series B to the Director, via General Porter 3/18/55

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET (1)

1 copy of Series B to the Director, via Mr. Reid 3/18/55

\* Indicates other than NSC distribution



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1954

OD-LS (10-8-54)-No. 343  
EXecutive 3-3300-Ext. 2201

Appointment of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to head a panel of scientists studying methods to mobilize more effectively scientific resources in the event of an emergency was announced today by Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Defense Mobilization.

The study, which is complementary to evaluations now being made in the scientific manpower field, will be completed in several months. After review by the ODM Science Advisory Committee, and Mr. Flemming, recommendations and findings will be submitted to the President.

The Panel will be made up of engineers and scientists from universities, industry and various Federal agencies.

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ODM 9314

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Graham	

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~~SECRET~~  
**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT**  
**OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 09-15-2017 BY J75J65T61 ADG

September 21, 1955

**MEMORANDUM FOR CARL GRAHAM**

**Subject: Questions Regarding Alsop Column on the Killian Report**

1. What are the exact statements that contain classified information?

In my opinion there is no classified information of technical nature based on the Killian report included in the Alsop column. The sole security breach is the revelation that a committee was constituted to examine the type of subject matter contained in the Alsop article. Although the existence of the committee has been a subject of a news release, the general subject area of its investigation has been classified ~~SECRET~~.

2. Is the published data accurate?

The published article is completely inaccurate in every major respect insofar as it attributes conclusions to the Killian report.

3. Is the published data classified properly?

The security classification covering the field of investigation of the Killian committee was established by the President. There is ample reason for this classification, including the following:

- a. Publication of the scope of the committee study indicates the extent of top level concern over this specific problem and makes the study an intelligence target.
- b. It provides an opportunity for writers such as Alsop to fabricate a story based on the existence of a study group which is difficult to refute in an authoritative way and which, as published, conveys an impression

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SEP 24 1971  
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of authenticity and supporting conclusions reacting to the detriment of the United States (domestically, in the Free World, and with respect to the USSR).

4. Can the published data be declassified for purposes of prosecution and, if so, what is the name of the person competent to testify concerning classification?

If the security breach described above is considered sufficiently serious for the purposes of prosecution, I feel that the general scope of the Killian exercise and the structural resemblance of the Alsop report to the Killian report could be declassified for purposes of providing evidence. The second half of this question need not be answered until the first half is answered in the affirmative.

5. What is the extent of dissemination, officially, of the classified data?

The Security Office, ODM, has a record of the actual dissemination of the Killian report.

6. Has the data been subject to prior official releases?

In the fall of 1954, a press release was issued stating that a committee under Dr. Killian had been organized "to study methods of mobilizing the scientific resources of the country for uses in the event of emergency." This is the only official reference that has been made to the Killian panel.

7. Has declassification of the data been decided upon prior to publication?

No

8. Did the classified data come from a specific document, and if so, what is the origin of the document?

I do not believe that a disclosure of the scope of the Killian committee or the structural resemblance of the Alsop report to the Killian report were based on the access of Alsop to a specific document since there is no similarity of language. It appears to be based on oral disclosure.

9. What is the name of the individual who is responsible for the security of the published classified information?


This question is not clear. All those having access to the document have a security responsibility in addition to those who have responsibility for custody.

10. Has the material, portions thereof, or enough background data been previously published, officially, or in the press in order to make educated speculation on the matter possible?

With the exception of the revelation of the scope of the Killian investigation and the structural resemblance of the Alsop column to the Killian report, all of the contents of the Alsop column are based on speculation. Since the emphasis on intercontinental ballistics missile developments may have come from other sources, the security of this emphasis could be the subject of an investigation apart from the Killian report.

11. Was clearance for publication sought from proper authorities prior to publication?

Not to my knowledge.



David Z. Beckler  
Special Assistant for  
Scientific Liaison

AIRTEL

FBI, WASH FIELD

9/22/55

DIRECTOR, FBI

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JOSEPH ALSOP

"THE WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES HERALD"  
ARTICLE ENTITLED "THE KILLIAN REPORT"  
IN 9/19/55 ISSUE  
ESPIONAGE - X

ReBu airtel 9/19/55 with attachment consisting of memo same date to Bureau from WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division.

The following investigation conducted by SA CARL E. GRAHAM 9/20 and 21/55:

J. PATRICK COYNE, Special Assistant, National Security Council (NSC) advised the Killian Committee was a special subcommittee of the Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, (ODM) and that report prepared by that Committee was issued by ODM and not by NSC, as had been erroneously reported in pertinent ALSOP Column. Efforts to interview Dr. ARTHUR S. FLEMMING, Director, ODM, 9/20/55 disclosed FLEMMING out of the city and not available for interview until Monday, 9/26/55. Contact with WILLIAM E. ELLIOTT, Security Officer, ODM, disclosed the so-called Killian Report was a document captioned "The Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee" issued under date of 2/14/55, also known under the caption of "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack" classified "Top Secret" and issued by the ODM. ELLIOTT explained in its initial issue the report was in two separate volumes, I and II, of which 25 complete copies were first made, and of those copies 13 were disseminated. ELLIOTT further explained the next issue of the report combined Volumes I and II into a single book form known as Series A, of which there were a total of 75 copies printed, with 42 of those copies disseminated. ELLIOTT stated the Report was reprinted again in Series B which was the same as Series A with minor corrections made. ELLIOTT said there were 51 copies of Series B printed and 47 copies disseminated; all extra copies not disseminated being retained by ODM in its document vault under ELLIOTT's supervision. The report in its form as printed under Series B consists of a total of 190 pages. ELLIOTT stated dissemination was handled by his office under the immediate control and supervision of Mrs. HELEN TALLMAN, Secretary to Mr. WILLIAM ELLIOTT.

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PAGE TWO

Relative to the 11 questions posed by the Department, as set forth in memo from Mr. TOMPKINS to the Director dated 9/19/55, WILLIAM E. ELLIOTT, Security Officer, ODM, referred Agent to Mr. DAVID Z. BECKLER, Special Assistant for Scientific Liaison and Executive Secretary, Science Advisory Committee, ODM. Mr. BECKLER, interviewed 9/20/55, later furnished on 9/21/55, in writing, answers to the questions asked by the Department, and BECKLER's comments, together with the questions, are set forth herein as follows:

1. What are the exact statements that contain classified information?

"In my opinion there is no classified information of technical nature based on the Killian report included in the Alsop column. The sole security breach is the revelation that a committee was constituted to examine the type of subject matter contained in the Alsop article. Although the existence of the committee has been a subject of a news release, the general subject area of its investigation has been classified SECRET."

2. Is the published data accurate?

"The published article is completely inaccurate in every major respect insofar as it attributes conclusions to the Killian report."

3. Is the published data classified properly?

"The security classification covering the field of investigation of the Killian committee was established by the President. There is ample reason for this classification, including the following:

- "a. Publication of the scope of the committee study indicates the extent of top level concern over this specific problem and makes the study an intelligence target.

- "b. It provides an opportunity for writers such as Alsop to fabricate a story based on the existence of a study group which is difficult to refute in an authoritative way and which, as published, conveys an impression of authenticity and supporting conclusions reacting to the detriment of the United States (domestically, in the Free World, and with respect to the USSR.)"

PAGE THREE

4. Can the published data be declassified for purposes of prosecution and, if so, what is the name of the person competent to testify concerning classification?

"If the security breach described above is considered sufficiently serious for the purposes of prosecution, I feel that the general scope of the Killian exercise and the structural resemblance of the Alsop report to the Killian report could be declassified for purposes of providing evidence. The second half of this question need not be answered until the first half is answered in the affirmative."

5. What is the extent of dissemination, officially, of the classified data?

"The Security Office, ODM, has a record of the actual dissemination of the Killian report."

6. Has the data been subject to prior official releases?

"In the fall of 1954, a press release was issued stating that a committee under Dr. Killian had been organized 'to study methods of mobilizing the scientific resources of the country for uses in the event of emergency.' This is the only official reference that has been made to the Killian panel."

7. Has declassification of the data been decided upon prior to publication?

"No"

8. Did the classified data come from a specific document, and if so, what is the origin of the document?

"I do not believe that a disclosure of the scope of the Killian committee or the structural resemblance of the Alsop report to the Killian report were based on the access of Alsop to a specific document since there is no similarity of language. It appears to be based on oral disclosure."

9. What is the name of the individual who is responsible for the security of the published classified information?

Page Four

"This question is not clear. All those having access to the document have a security responsibility in addition to those who have responsibility for custody."

10. Has the material, portions thereof, or enough background data been previously published, officially, or in the press in order to make educated speculation on the matter possible?

"With the exception of the revelation of the scope of the Killian investigation and the structural resemblance of the Alsop column to the Killian report, all of the contents of the Alsop column are based on speculation. Since the emphasis on intercontinental ballistics missile developments may have come from other sources, the security of this emphasis could be the subject of an investigation apart from the Killian report."

11. Was clearance for publication sought from proper authorities prior to publication?

"Not to my knowledge."

According to BECKLER, the "timing" of Alsop's article was appropriate in view of the fact that the Intercontinental Ballistics Missile (ICBM) topic, which was only one of many problems dealt with in the Killian Report was not considered or discussed at an NSC meeting until 9/8/55. He stated the whole Killian Report, initially published in 2/55 and disseminated shortly thereafter, was not considered by the NSC until its meeting 7/28/55, but at that time the ICBM portion of the Killian Report was not considered or discussed. It was further explained that at the 8/4/55 NSC Meeting, NSC considered everything in the Killian Report except the ICBM matter in order that the NSC planning board could first be briefed on the ICBM phase before the full discussion of the matter by NSC itself. BECKLER stated the ICBM portion of the Killian report was a separate item on the agenda at the 9/8/55 NSC meeting. He further pointed out the Alsop article led its reader to believe the Killian Report was devoted exclusively to the ICBM problem, while as a matter of fact, the Killian Report dealt with a whole series of problems, of which the ICBM matter was a single topic within that report.



Page Five

BECKLER also observed the Alsop article in addition to its emphasis on ICBM also stressed the matter of the need to devote more funds to guided missiles. BECKLER stated in this regard it was of possible interest to note that the Department of the Air Force, in his opinion would be most interested in obtaining additional appropriations for ICBM in view of the fact that the Air Force is the "Executive Agency" with regard to ICBM. In further comment on this latter point, BECKLER noted that the Alsop Column also named TREVOR GARDNER, Assistant Secretary of Air for Research and Development, as having publicly declared increased funds should be made available for his operations.

BECKLER observed that Alsop in his column included two names, ROBERT C. SPRAGUE and JEROME WEISNER, as having been members of the Killian Committee, while as a matter of fact, SPRAGUE and WEISNER were not members of the Committee; also omitted the names of two other prominent members; DETLEV BRONK, President of the National Academy of Sciences, and Dr. EDWIN LAND, President of the Polaroid Company. He also observed the Alsop article led the reader to believe that the Killian Report had just recently been prepared and submitted, while as a matter of fact, the study was completed and published in 2/55. It was BECKLER's expressed opinion that the Alsop article did not contain any information that would constitute harm to the National Defense, but he said the most damaging effect of the Alsop article was the indication Alsop had talked to a person or persons with knowledge of the Killian Report, thus indicating a compromise because the very existence of the report itself was classified information.

WILLIAM E. ELLIOTT, Security Officer, ODM, noted that dissemination of the pertinent document occurred during the period of February through April, 1955, with the majority of the copies disseminated during February or March, 1955. A recap of the dissemination, including 13 sets of Volumes I and II, 42 copies of Series A and 47 copies of Series B, made a total of 102 copies disseminated through ELLIOTT's Office. He said all copies were properly receipted for. He said a total of 66 copies of the report went to the Department of Defense with other dissemination including [redacted] State, Federal Civil Defense, Justice, Treasury, FOA, Bureau of Budget, and copies to the White House, to the President, and also for the Vice-president. ELLIOTT expressed the opinion he would hazard a guess that the number of persons having availability to the finished product, the Killian Report, would range 25 to 50 persons per copy disseminated. BECKLER expressed

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the opinion that the number of persons having legitimate knowledge of various topics discussed in the Killian Report would number in the hundreds. With regard to Question No. 6 posed by the Department in its memorandum 9/19/55 as to whether the pertinent data had been subject to proper official release, ELLIOTT furnished a copy of a press release from ODM dated 10/8/54, the text of which is set forth as follows:

"Appointment of Dr. JAMES R. KILLIAN, Jr., President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to head a panel of scientists studying methods to mobilize more effectively scientific resources in the event of an emergency was announced today by ARTHUR S. FLEMING, Director of Defense Mobilization.

"The study, which is complementary to evaluations now being made in the scientific manpower field, will be completed in several months. After review by the ODM Science Advisory Committee, and Mr. FLEMING, recommendations and findings will be submitted to the President.

"The Panel will be made up of engineers and scientists from universities, industry and various Federal agencies."

With regard to the Department's Question No. 9 concerning responsibility for the security of the published classified information, Mr. ELLIOTT stated as Security Officer for ODM, he was the officer responsible for the security of the Killian Report during its preparation and dissemination, but he pointed out after dissemination, any recipient individual or agency assumed responsibility for security of the document and ODM had no further control of those copies disseminated. ELLIOTT stated there had been no requests received by his office for permission to reproduce the pertinent document, although he offered the opinion it was his belief in all probability the document or portions thereof had been reproduced by recipients of the Report. ELLIOTT concluded that no inquiries had been received in his office from AISOP for clearance or permission to publish the pertinent newspaper column.

Page Seven

LEE W. SCHOOLER, Information Officer of ODM, advised no "Clearance for Publication" had been sought prior to the publication of the Alsop article, although it was ascertained that on Thursday, 9/15/55 JOSEPH ALSOP called SCHOOLER's Office and in his absence inquired of his secretary, JOSEPHINE BURNS, as to who was handling the Killian Report, and Miss BURNS referred ALSOP to the Science Advisory Committee.

Mrs. KATHRYN H. BEARD, Secretary to DAVID BECKLER, Science Advisory Committee, stated on Thursday, 9/15/55, a girl who identified herself as being in Mr. ALSOP's office called and inquired for the names of the members of the Science Advisory Committee. Inasmuch as the names of the Committee members are public information and are printed in the Federal Register, Mrs. BEARD furnished the names of the Committee members, as well as their business or professional affiliations. ~~Although~~ She did not mention the names of WEISHER or SPRAGUE, whose names ALSOP included in his article erroneously naming them as members of the Killian Committee.

As a matter of additional information, LEE W. SCHOOLER, Information Officer, ODM, advised he first became aware of the ALSOP article Sunday night, 9/18/55 when the duty officer at ODM called to advise that Mr. KILLIAN had called to inform that newspapermen were requesting his comments on the ALSOP article which first appeared in the early Monday morning edition of the New York Herald Tribune which went on sale Sunday night. SCHOOLER stated KILLIAN wanted advice as to what response he should make to the inquiries from the newsmen. SCHOOLER immediately contacted Dr. FLETTING, who told him to advise KILLIAN to refer all inquiries to ODM. SCHOOLER stated he contacted KILLIAN and so instructed him. Thereafter, SCHOOLER immediately contacted Mr. BECKLER, who was then in California. The matter then was also immediately brought to the attention of Mr. DILLON ANDERSON, Special Assistant to the President.

Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC, stated he received a phone call Sunday night, 9/18/55 from the Associated Press asking for his comments on the New York Herald Tribune column of JOSEPH ALSOP concerning the Killian Report. GLEASON said he replied he had not seen the ALSOP Column, and even if he had, he could not make any comment on it. GLEASON stated he had no suggestions as to where a leak of information may have occurred with regard to the Killian

Page Eight

Report, and he said it was his personal impression the ALSOP story did not come from any single source, either one who attended an NSC meeting or had the Killian Report available to him. He said it was his impression the ALSOP Column was a compilation of information gathered by ALSOP piecemeal over an extended period of time.

GLEASON further stated that at the NSC meeting 9/8/55 when the ICBM matter was discussed, there were 17 persons in attendance at this discussion. He said one point significant to the ALSOP article discussed the time table stages while the actual discussion as it occurred at the NSC meeting did not touch on this topic. GLEASON concluded that no inquiries had been received at NSC from either of the ALSOP brothers for "clearance" to prepare or publish the article in question.

Arrangements being made to obtain an interview with Dr. ARTHUR S. FLEMING, Director, ODM, on Monday, 9/26/55. Bureau will be fully advised.

Dr. ARTHUR S. FLEMING, Director, ODM, telephonically contacted SA GRAHAM at Noon today to advise he would be available for interview at 11 A.M., Monday, September 26 next. He stated he was cognizant that inquiry was being conducted in instant matter and had read the questions asked of DAVID Z. BECKLER, and had read the answers provided by BECKLER as set forth previously herein. Dr. FLEMING added that BECKLER's answers to the questions appeared to be satisfactory and met with his approval.

Further results following an interview with Dr. FLEMING September 26 will be reported immediately.

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DIRECTOR [REDACTED]

JOSEPH ALSOP  
"THE WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES HERALD"  
ARTICLE ENTITLED "THE KILLIAN REPORT"  
IN 9/19/55 ISSUE  
ESPIONAGE - X

Re WFO airtel 9/22/55, in which was contained the result of inquiry conducted thus far, including answers furnished by DAVID Z. BECKLER, Special Assistant for Scientific Liaison and Executive Secretary, Scientific Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), in answer to questions posed by WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, as initially forwarded with Bureau airtel 9/19/55.

Dr. ARTHUR S. FLEMMING, Director, ODM, today advised the various questions answered by DAVID Z. BECKLER, as set forth in referenced WFO airtel, were in accordance with his views with reference to instant ALSOP article. Dr. FLEMMING went on to relate his first reaction to the ALSOP article was on the occasion of having the article read to him by LEE SCHOOLER, Information Officer, on the night of Sunday, September 18 last, at which time his first reaction was the ALSOP article contained classified information in violation of the espionage statutes. However, Dr. FLEMMING continued, on the following morning, Monday, 9/19/55, after reading the ALSOP article, he changed his mind in believing the article constituted a violation of the espionage statute. He said he did not believe the ALSOP column of 9/19/55 contained any information which would harm the national defense, nor did it contain any information classified in the light of security information.

Dr. FLEMMING said he noted the ALSOP article took a line of speculation and then "tied" it into the Killian Report, in order to give the article authenticity. Dr. FLEMMING further observed it was his belief ALSOP did not have a direct informant who was either cognizant with the contents of the Killian Report or who had attended meetings of the National Security Council or the National Security Council Planning Board where

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discussions concerning the Killian Report took place. He said it was his belief that ALSOP had a source who had talked to someone who possibly had seen the Killian Report or knew something of the discussions which took place concerning various phases of the Killian Report. Dr. FLEMING added the ALSOP article stressed the intercontinental ballistics missile (ICBM) matter and stressed the need for additional funds for that development, and FLEMING observed that within the Department of Air Force, executive agency for ICBM, there were "crusaders" wanting additional funds for this project. As a matter of fact, FLEMING commented, the money issue for ICBM had been a "hot one," internally speaking, when discussions pertaining to developments of ICBM have taken place. FLEMING observed it was interesting to note the mention of the name of TREVOR GARDNER, Assistant Secretary of Air for Research and Development, who, according to the ALSOP column, was stated to have declared the Air Force's Research and Development outlay ought to be currently increased by two hundred million dollars. Dr. FLEMING stated this figure of two hundred million dollars was close to an accurate figure which had been discussed, the figure actually being two hundred fifty million dollars. Dr. FLEMING stated he noted the ALSOP article would lead its reader to believe that so far no action had been taken as a result of the Killian Report while, as a matter of fact, Dr. FLEMING stated all of the matters contained as topics in the Killian Report had been the subject of action already taken, and he commented that ALSOP was way behind on the procession of events.

Dr. FLEMING stated he did not believe there was any direct leak of information relative to the contents of the Killian Report, and he stated, although it was obvious someone possibly had talked about it, he did not have any suggestion as to the identity of any individuals or agency possibly responsible.

As a matter of additional interest, DAVID Z. BECKLER telephonically contacted SA GRAHAM to advise that he had additional information of possible assistance. He stated that on Friday, 9/23/55, he had lunch with a close friend, Mr. PEREGRINE WHITE, a civilian employee in the Office of Ordnance Research, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. During their conversation at lunch, a discussion arose concerning the ALSOP brothers. At this time, according to BECKLER, WHITE recited that he was in Washington a couple of months previously, at which time he stopped in to see a close friend, one PHILIP K. ALLEN, civilian employee in the Office of the Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Legislation and Public Affairs, Room 3E960, Pentagon. WHITE told BECKLER his discussion with ALLEN turned to the ALSOP brothers having then published a short time previously an article having to do with an artificial space satellite, and WHITE speculated as to where the ALSOPS got the information. At that time, according to what WHITE told

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BECKLER, ALLEN related he knew JOSEPH ALSOP and had been in camp with him (possibly basic training during World War II), and ALLEN volunteered it was no mystery to him about ALSOP's information as he, ALLEN, knew a Colonel in the Air Force who hands it out to ALSOP.

In connection with the foregoing, BECKLER requested his identity to remain confidential and, as well, requested that his friend, WHITE, should not be interviewed in this matter; however, suggested ALLEN's office would fall within the area of dissemination of the Killian Report, and ALLEN could logically be interviewed without fear ALLEN would trace his account concerning ALSOP back to WHITE.

No effort being made to interview PHILIP K. ALLEN, unless advised to do so by the Bureau.

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT:

WASHINGTON FIELD

~~SECRET~~

REPORT MADE AT <b>WASHINGTON, D. C.</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>9/28/55</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>9/20-23,26/55</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>CARL E. GRAHAM</b>	<b>bms</b>
TITLE <b>JOSEPH ALSOP "The Washington Post And Times Herald" Article Entitled "The Killian Report" in 9/19/55 Issue</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>ESPIONAGE - X</b>	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Syndicated news column by JOSEPH ALSOP in "The Washington Post And Times Herald" newspaper, 9/19/55, captioned, "The Killian Report," made reference to a study conducted by a special science committee reporting to the President. Investigation conducted to ascertain whether news column contained classified information. DAVID Z. BECKLER, Executive Secretary, Science Advisory Committee, ODM, which authored pertinent "Top Secret" document, "The Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee," dated 2/14/55, stated ALSOP article did not contain any classified information of technical nature based on the Killian Report or information which would harm the national defense; also stated ALSOP column completely inaccurate. This opinion also expressed by Dr. ARTHUR S. FLEMMING, Director, ODM. Dissemination of "Killian Report" totaled 102 copies. WILLIAM E. ELLIOTT, Security Officer, ODM, of opinion number of persons having availability to "Killian Report" would range from 25 to 50 persons per copy disseminated.

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APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
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DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

This investigation was initiated at the request of Mr. WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice, concerning an article which appeared in the September 19, 1955 issue of "The Washington Post And Times Herald" newspaper, written by JOSEPH ALSOP, in the nationally syndicated column, "Matter of Fact." The article by ALSOP was entitled, "The Killian Report." With reference to the article by JOSEPH ALSOP, Mr. TOMPKINS requested the following information be developed:

- "(1) What are the exact statements that contain classified information?
- (2) Is the published data accurate?
- (3) Is the published data classified properly?
- (4) Can the published data be declassified for purposes of prosecution and, if so, what is the name of the person competent to testify concerning classification?
- (5) What is the extent of dissemination, officially, of the classified data?
- (6) Has the data been subject to prior official releases?
- (7) Has declassification of the data been decided upon prior to publication?
- (8) Did the classified data come from a specific document, and if so, what is the origin of the document?
- (9) What is the name of the individual who is responsible for the security of the published classified information?
- (10) Has the material, portions thereof, or enough background data been previously published, officially, or in the press in order to make educated speculation on the matter possible?
- (11) Was clearance for publication sought from proper authorities prior to publication?"

For purposes of ready reference, a photostat of the article by JOSEPH ALSOP is made a part of instant report.

# Matter of Fact . . . . . By Joseph Alsop

## The Killian Report

ACCORDING to an official report that has been presented to the National Security Council, the Soviet Union

is now overtaking the United States in the air-atomic weapons race.

As of now, by this report's estimate, the frequently mentioned "American lead" may be expected to become a Soviet lead in the period 1960-1965.

The basis of this estimate is the expectation that in 1960-1965, the Soviets will enjoy a decided superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are the multiple-staged rockets that will be able to carry A- or H-bomb warheads, at speeds of many thousands of miles an hour through the upper air, from Russian launching sites to American targets.

The report that the National Security Council now has before it also includes recommendations for reversing this unfavorable trend in the Soviet-American balance of power. But these recommendations will be difficult, if not impossible, to implement without upsetting the Administration's present budgetary and fiscal plans.

SUCH, it can now be revealed, are the essential results of the most important and intensive high-level study of the relative curves of Soviet and American armed strength that has yet been attempted. The study was made by the Killian Committee, so called from its chairman, the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. James R. Killian Jr.

The Committee, which included both leaders of science and leaders of industry, was set up by the National Security Council by direction of President Eisenhower, in the troubled aftermath of the second H-bomb explosion at Eniwetok in the spring of 1954.



Joseph Alsop

Technically, the Killian Committee was a subcommittee of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, on which Dr. Killian served under the chairmanship of Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, president of the California Institute of Technology. But in practice, the Killian Committee was virtually another name for the Scientific Advisory Committee, with the chairmanship temporarily transferred from Dr. DuBridge to Dr. Killian, and with a number of additional members co-opted for this special study.

Besides Dr. Killian and Dr. DuBridge, among those who served were Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; Dr. Charles Lauritsen, professor of physics at California Institute of Technology; Dr. I. I. Rabi, professor of physics at Columbia University and chief scientific adviser to the Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Jerrold Zacharias, director of the MIT Laboratory of Nuclear Science; Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, also of MIT; Dr. James B. Fisk, executive vice president of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Bruce S. Old, of Arthur D. Little, Inc.; Robert C. Sprague, president of the Sprague Electric Co., and Charles A. Thomas, president of Monsanto Chemical Co.

The foregoing is only a partial list of the full members of the committee. In addition, large numbers of other emi-

nent experts were employed as consultants, so that a total of about 50 of the most highly qualified men in this country joined, in one way or another, in the Killian Committee's work.

THE COMMITTEE was given complete access to all the huge mass of information available to the American Government. It labored for many months, twice requesting and twice receiving extensions of deadline that the National Security Council had originally set for its report.

In the end, rather more than two months ago, the Committee laid before the President a unanimous report, with no significant dissents on any point. It was transmitted by President Eisenhower to the National Security Council. The NSC then passed on the report to a narrowly restricted circle of policy-makers in the State Department, the armed services and Central Intelligence Agency. The policymakers' comments and recommendations must now be returned to the NSC, where the issues raised by the Killian report will presumably be debated and decided when the President returns to Washington.

SUCH IS the background and history of this disturbing document. Three main factors are known to have led the Killian Committee to the somewhat bleak conclusions set forth above.

The first factor, which is almost old hat by now, was the continuous build-up of the Soviet A- and H-bomb stockpile. Although by no means so great as the American stockpile, the Soviet stockpile of weapons of absolute destruction is still becoming great enough to be decisive. With both giant powers enjoying relative nuclear plenty, the most important measure of the balance between them, of course, becomes the capability of delivering the absolute weapons, rather than the number of those weapons in stock.

The second factor, which was long suspected and finally positively confirmed by the so-called Moscow overflights last spring, was the massive Soviet production of high-quality long-and medium-range jet bombers and night and day jet fighters.

The Russian strategic air force is being rapidly re-equipped with "Bisons" and "Badgers," which are the new Russian B-25-like and B-47-like bombers. This process is continually improving the Soviet capability of striking at American targets and of neutralizing their overseas bases on which our own Strategic Air Command so largely depends. By the same token, the rapid re-equipment of the Soviet air defense command with the new Russian day and night fighters, the "Farmer" and the "Flashlight," is proportionally reducing the American Strategic Air Command's capability of striking at Russian targets.

Finally, the third and most important factor that influenced the Killian report was the presumed Soviet progress in guided missile development. As has been pointed out before, the Soviet guided missile effort has been organized on a Manhattan District pattern, with a comparable priority, ever since the end of the last world war.

IN AMERICA, the Eisenhower Administration has stepped up outlays on missile development, and very impor-

tant successes have already been achieved with the shorter range missiles. Yet even today the American guided missile effort is essentially organized on a business-as-usual basis.

It is not excluded that the United States will have an intercontinental missile by 1960. The Air Force's Atlas Project, for a true intercontinental ballistic missile, or the Navajo Project, for a long-range ram-jet missile, may well have produced a prototype by that date.

But after reviewing all the evidence concerning present development curves, the members of the Killian Committee concluded that we should expect the Soviets to enjoy an important predominance in intercontinental guided missiles from 1960 to 1965. The Committee's judgment, in short, is a judgment of relative strength. But it is nonetheless significant for all that, as is shown by the Committee's reported analysis of what may be called the phases of the Soviet-American power balance.

The first phase, which is definitely stated to be past, was the phase of unchallenged American superiority in strategic air power and atomic bombs. In this phase, the American bargaining position was greatly superior to the Soviet bargaining position in all international dealings.

The second phase, in which we now find ourselves, is a transitional phase. For the present, although the United States has long ago lost anything like unchallenged superiority, this country still has the edge in strength. Therefore this country still possesses some remaining bargaining advantage.

On the other hand, this American edge is constantly being narrowed by the improvements in the Soviet strategic air force and air defense command above-noted. Perhaps in two years' time, the American edge will cease to exist altogether, if the edge does not then actually pass to the Soviets. The bargaining position, therefore, is changing and will continue to change for the worse in the present phase.

As for the third phase, it is of course the final period when the Soviets will attain predominance in intercontinental guided missiles. There will be a Soviet lead comparable to the American lead that existed in the first phase of the power balance. In this phase of the Soviet lead, the international bargaining position of the United States, and indeed of the whole free world, will be markedly inferior to the bargaining position of the Soviet Union and its Communist empire.

**THE EMPHASIS** on the relative bargaining positions of the contestants in the world power struggle is noteworthy. If authoritative reports are to be believed, the Killian Committee made no highly colored forecasts that the Kremlin would launch a general war during the predicted period of the Soviet lead. Whichever side has the lead, general war will no doubt remain a fearful risk for both sides.

What is clearly expected, rather, is bold and determined Soviet exploitation of a superior bargaining position, whose very superiority, in turn, will cause a relatively feeble and uncertain American and Free World response to the Kremlin's moves.

The Killian Committee, of course, had no opportunity to relate its projection of Soviet and American strength curves

to the events of the summit meeting at Geneva. But a good many of the policymakers who are studying the Committee's report have pointed out that if the analysis of phases is correct, it suggests a special Soviet motive at Geneva. Obviously, it is only prudent for the Soviets to promote a general relaxation of Western effort and alertness, pending the moment when the international bargaining positions will finally be changed in the Kremlin's favor.

The Killian Committee's recommendations for altering the projection of Soviet and American curves of strength are not known in detail. They take the form, apparently, of proposals for revision of the first NSC directive of 1955—the first NSC paper of each year, according to custom, being a broad blueprint for the year's defense program.

It is quite clear, however, that implementation of the Killian Committee's recommendations will necessitate a pretty sharp reversal of present fiscal and budgetary trends. A major intensification of the long-range guided missile effort, for instance, would show up primarily in the form of increases in the Air Force's research and development expenditures. This is because the intercontinental missile projects are within the province of the Air Research and Development Command.

A COUPLE of months ago, Trevor Gardner, Assistant Secretary of Air for Research and Development, publicly declared that the Air Force's research and development outlays ought to be currently increased by \$200 million. At present, instead of granting this increase, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson is pressing for a decrease of \$200 million in these same expenditures.

Any real, all-out, Manhattan District-style effort to build intercontinental missiles would certainly require authority to let contracts well above an additional \$200 million in the current fiscal year. And it would equally certainly have far more volcanic effect on next year's important budget.

By the same token the Killian Committee's recommendations for improvement in America's air defenses are bound to be enormously costly if implemented. For these recommendations, the extremely able Robert Sprague of the Sprague Electric Co., the first Eisenhower candidate for Undersecretary of the Air Force, reportedly had the primary responsibility.

AT PRESENT, both the day and night fighters of the American Air Defense Command are at least obsolescent, if not actually obsolete, when measured against the new Soviet jet bombers, the "Bisons" and "Badgers." Hence a crash effort is required to produce the superior American F-102s and F-104s, which are now being received in very small trickles.

Moreover, although the so-called Dew Line, or distant early warning line, is already being built in the Canadian Far North, no provision has as yet been made for Far Northern bases. There is nowhere to put aircraft and missiles which can respond to the Dew Line's early warning, by knocking down attackers remote from their target. Such bases will be very costly, and

added units will be needed to station on the bases if the bases are authorized and built.

Then again, there is a theoretical possibility of an anti-air missile with the range and speed to intercept and destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles before they re-enter the earth's atmosphere. An all-out, Manhattan District-style effort to produce such defensive missiles must begin in a small way, of course. But from the start, such an effort will constitute a commitment to an immense double burden in the future. Both offensive and defensive long-range missiles will have to be produced in quantity, and launching sites and expensive manpower to stand ready to fire both kinds of birds will be needed, too.

IN SHORT, if the projections of the Killian report are correct, the report demands a series of distinctly painful choices. Furthermore, the time scale covered by the Killian report's projections is very short, in terms of the slow process of weapons development and weapons production.

Hence, the choices cannot easily be delayed until next year or the year after. Putting off implementing the Killian report's recommendations will be another way, in fact, of rejecting those recommendations. For the loss of time will mean the loss of opportunity to change the present Soviet and American strength curves.

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Mr. J. PATRICK COYNE, Special Assistant, National Security Council (NSC), was interviewed on September 20, 1955. Mr. COYNE stated the Killian Committee was a Special Subcommittee of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), and he added the report prepared by that Subcommittee was issued by ODM and not by the NSC, as had been reported erroneously in the pertinent ALSOP column.

In the absence of Dr. ARTHUR S. FLEMMING, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, September 20, 1955, interview was had with Mr. WILLIAM E. ELLIOTT, Security Officer, Office of Defense Mobilization, Room 18, Executive Office Building, 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. Mr. ELLIOTT stated the so-called "Killian Report" was a document captioned, "The Report To The President By the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee," issued under date of February 14, 1955 and also known under the caption of "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack." ELLIOTT stated the report was classified "Top Secret" and had been authored by the Office of Defense Mobilization and disseminated under the immediate supervision of the Security Office of ODM. Mr. ELLIOTT explained in its initial issue, the report was in two separate volumes, I and II, of which twenty-five complete copies were first made, and of those copies, thirteen were disseminated.

ELLIOTT further explained the next issue of the same report combined Volumes I and II into a single book form known as series A, of which there were a total of seventy-five copies printed with forty-two of those copies disseminated. ELLIOTT added the report was reprinted again in Series B, of which there were a total of fifty-one copies printed with forty-seven copies disseminated. Mr. ELLIOTT stated all extra copies of the reports not disseminated had been retained by ODM in its document vault under ELLIOTT's supervision. Mr. ELLIOTT stated actual printing of the report was done by the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] where close security supervision was enforced.

Mr. ELLIOTT stated the final issues of the report as printed under Series B consisted of a total of 190 pages. He added that dissemination was handled by his office under the immediate control and supervision of Mrs. HELEN TALLMAN, secretary to Mr. ELLIOTT.

Mr. ELLIOTT noted that dissemination of the pertinent document occurred during the period of February through April, 1955, with the majority of the copies disseminated during February, 1955 or March, 1955. A recap of the dissemination, as will be noted in detail hereinafter, discloses that thirteen sets of Volumes I and II were disseminated; forty-two copies of Series A were disseminated and forty-seven copies of Series B were disseminated; total dissemination amounting to 102 copies disseminated through ELLIOTT's office. The dissemination of the pertinent document is set forth here as follows:

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES PANEL  
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1955

<u>Volumes I and II:</u>	The first printing of the report was in two volumes.
<u>Series A:</u>	Consolidation of Volumes I and II into one volume.
<u>Series B:</u>	Rerun of Series A with certain minor corrections.

White House (3)

\*2 copies of Volumes I and II to Colonel GOODPASTER,  
March 18, 1955 -- One set for the President,  
March 18, 1955.

1 copy of Series B to Commander BEACH, March 18, 1955.

Vice President (1)

1 copy of Series B, via S. EVERETT GLEASON, NSC,  
March 18, 1955.

Special Assistant to the President (1)

1 copy of Series B to NELSON ROCKEFELLER, March 18, 1955.

(9)

\*2 copies of Volumes I and II (General ROBERT CUTLER,  
February 23, 1955, and Mr. SPRAGUE, February 25,  
1955).

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[redacted] (9) (Cont'd)

1 copy of Series B to each of the following:

ROBERT CUTLER; JAMES S. LAY, JR.;  
J. PATRICK COYNE; MARION W. BOGGS;  
S. EVERETT GLEASON; Executive  
Officer, Operations Coordinating  
Board, [redacted] via Mr. STAATS; and  
Chairman, Interdepartmental  
Committee on [redacted],  
(all March 18, 1955).

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[redacted] (7)

- \*1 copy of Volumes I and II to the Director,  
February 28, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to the Director, via Mr. AMORY,  
March 18, 1955.
- \*5 copies of Series B to H. M. CHADWELL, March 31,  
1955.

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- \*1 copy of Volumes I and II to the Chairman,  
February 28, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to the Chairman, via Commander  
NELSON, March 18, 1955.
- \*1 copy of Series B to Dr. JOHN VON NEUMANN. (This  
copy was returned March 23, 1955.)
- \*3 copies of Series B to the Chairman, April 6, 1955.

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Department of Defense (66)

Office of Secretary of Defense (51)

- \*6 copies of Volumes I and II to Mr. QUARLES,  
February 18, 1955.
- \*5 copies of Series A to Mr. QUARLES, Febru-  
ary 21, 1955.
- \*1 copy of Series A to Mr. WILSON, February 25,  
1955.
- \*20 copies of Series A to Mr. QUARLES, March 4,  
1955.
- \*15 copies of Series A to Mr. QUARLES, March 11,  
1955.



Department of Defense (66) (Cont'd)Office of Secretary of Defense (51) (Cont'd)

- 4 copies of Series B to the Secretary, via General BONESTEEL, March 18, 1955.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (6)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Chairman, via General GERHART, March 18, 1955.
- 5 copies of Series B to Joint Chiefs of Staff, via Captain HUTCHINSON, March 18, 1955.

Army (2)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Colonel McCORRY, March 18, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to Army Chief of Staff, March 18, 1955.

Navy (3)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Captain ADAMS, March 18, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to the Chief of Naval Operations, March 18, 1955.
- \*1 copy of Series B to Dr. E. R. PLORE, Office of Naval Research, March 17, 1955.

Air Force (3)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Colonel KINNEY, March 18, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Air, March 18, 1955.
- \*1 copy of Series B to Lieutenant General HAROLD L. GEORGE, Office, Chief of Staff, USAF, April 20, 1955.

Marine Corps (1)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Commandant, via Colonel WADE, March 18, 1955.

Department of State (3)

- \*1 copy of Volumes I and II to the Secretary, March 4, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Mr. BOWIE, March 18, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to the Under Secretary, via Mr. BISHOP, March 18, 1955.

Federal Civil Defense Administration (2)

- \*1 copy of Series A to the Administrator, March 7, 1955.
- 1 copy of Series B to the Administrator, via Mr. SPEAR, March 18, 1955.

Department of Justice (1)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Attorney General, via BARRETT McDONALD, March 18, 1955.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (1)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (J. EDGAR HOOVER), March 18, 1955.

Department of Treasury (1)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Secretary, via Mr. ROSE, March 18, 1955.

Foreign Operations Administration (1)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Director, via General PORTER, March 18, 1955.

Bureau of the Budget (1)

- 1 copy of Series B to the Director, via Mr. REID, March 18, 1955.

\* Indicates other than NSC distribution.



With reference to the previously described dissemination of the Killian Report, Mr. ELLIOTT stated he would hazard a guess that the number of persons having legitimate availability to the complete report would range possibly twenty-five to fifty persons per copy disseminated.

In the light of question number nine posed by Mr. WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice -- the name of the individual who is responsible for the security of the published classified information -- Mr. ELLIOTT stated that as Security Officer for ODM, he was the person responsible for the security of the Killian Report during its preparation and dissemination, but he pointed out that after dissemination, any recipient individual or agency assumed responsibility for the security and safeguarding of this "Top Secret" document, and that the Office of Defense Mobilization had no further control of those copies disseminated.

Mr. ELLIOTT concluded there had been no requests received by his office for permission to reproduce the pertinent document, although he offered the opinion it was his belief that in all probability the document or possibly portions thereof had been reproduced by recipients of the report. He added that no inquiry had been received at ODM from JOSEPH ALSOP for clearance or permission to publish the pertinent newspaper column.

Mr. ELLIOTT stated the "Killian Report" had been prepared by a special group under the immediate coordinating supervision of Mr. DAVID Z. BECKLER, Special Assistant for Scientific Liaison and Executive Secretary of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM.

Mr. BECKLER was interviewed September 20, 1955, at which time he furnished his personal comments regarding the JOSEPH ALSOP newspaper column, and he stated he would prepare in writing answers to the questions asked by Mr. WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice.

The questions and the answers as furnished September 21, 1955 by Mr. BECKLER are set forth as follows:

1. What are the exact statements that contain classified information?

"In my opinion there is no classified information of technical nature based on the Killian report included in the ALSOP column. The sole security breach is the revelation that a committee was constituted to examine the type of subject matter contained in the ALSOP article. Although the existence of the committee has been a subject of a news release, the general subject area of its investigation has been classified SECRET."

2. Is the published data accurate?

"The published article is completely inaccurate in every major respect insofar as it attributes conclusions to the Killian report."

3. Is the published data classified properly?

"The security classification covering the field of investigation of the Killian committee was established by the President. There is ample reason for this classification, including the following:

- "a. Publication of the scope of the committee study indicates the extent of top level concern over this specific problem and makes the study an intelligence target.
- "b. It provides an opportunity for writers such as ALSOP to fabricate a story based on the existence of a study group which is difficult to refute in an authoritative way and which, as published, conveys an impression

of authenticity and supporting conclusions reacting to the detriment of the United States (domestically, in the Free World, and with respect to the USSR)."

4. Can the published data be declassified for purposes of prosecution and, if so, what is the name of the person competent to testify concerning classification?

"If the security breach described above is considered sufficiently serious for the purposes of prosecution, I feel that the general scope of the Killian exercise and the structural resemblance of the ALSOP report to the Killian report could be declassified for purposes of providing evidence. The second half of this question need not be answered until the first half is answered in the affirmative."

5. What is the extent of dissemination, officially, of the classified data?

"The Security Office, ODM, has a record of the actual dissemination of the Killian report."

6. Has the data been subject to prior official releases?

"In the fall of 1954, a press release was issued stating that a committee under Dr. KILLIAN had been organized 'to study methods of mobilizing the scientific resources of the country for uses in the event of emergency.' This is the only official reference that has been made to the Killian panel."

7. Has declassification of the data been decided upon prior to publication?

"No"

8. Did the classified data come from a specific document, and if so, what is the origin of the document?

"I do not believe that a disclosure of the scope of the Killian committee or the structural resemblance of the ALSOP report to the Killian report were based on the access of ALSOP to a specific document since there is no similarity of language. It appears to be based on oral disclosure."

9. What is the name of the individual who is responsible for the security of the published classified information?

"This question is not clear. All those having access to the document have a security responsibility in addition to those who have responsibility for custody."

10. Has the material, portions thereof, or enough background data been previously published, officially, or in the press in order to make educated speculation on the matter possible?

"With the exception of the revelation of the scope of the Killian investigation and the structural resemblance of the ALSOP column to the Killian report, all of the contents of the ALSOP column are based on speculation. Since the emphasis on inter-continental ballistics missile developments may have come from other sources, the security of this emphasis could be the subject of an investigation apart from the Killian report."

11. Was clearance for publication sought from proper authorities prior to publication?

"Not to my knowledge."

According to Mr. DECKLER, the "timing" of the ALSOP newspaper article was appropriate in view of the fact that the

and credited them with having been members of the Killian Committee, while as a matter of fact, BECKLER stated SPRAGUE and WIESNER were not members of the Committee. He also pointed out that the names of two other prominent members, DETLEV BRONK, President of the National Academy of Sciences, and Dr. EDWIN LAND, President of the Polaroid Company, had been omitted by ALSOP in his article.

BECKLER further observed the news article by ALSOP leads its reader to believe that the Killian Report had just recently been prepared and submitted, while as a matter of fact, BECKLER stated the study had been completed and published early in 1955. It was BECKLER's expressed opinion that the ALSOP article did not contain any information that would constitute harm to the national defense, but he said the most damaging effect of the ALSOP article was the indication that ALSOP had talked to a person or persons who had some knowledge of the Killian Report, thus indicating a compromise, because the very existence of the report itself had been classified "Secret" by the President.

Mr. BECKLER expressed the personal opinion that the number of persons having legitimate knowledge of the various topics discussed and dealt with in the Killian Report would number in the hundreds.

With regard to question number six posed by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice as to whether there had been any prior official release of information concerning instant matter, Mr. WILLIAM E. ELLIOTT, Security Officer, in the presence of Mr. BECKLER, furnished a copy of a press release from ODM dated October 8, 1954, the text of which is set forth as follows:

"Appointment of Dr. JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR., President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to head a panel of scientists studying methods to mobilize more effectively scientific resources in the event of an emergency was announced today by ARTHUR S. FLEMING, Director of Defense Mobilization.

"The study, which is complementary to evaluations now being made in the scientific manpower

field, will be completed in several months. After review by the ODM Science Advisory Committee, and Mr. FLEMING, recommendations and findings will be submitted to the President.

"The Panel will be made up of engineers and scientists from universities, industry and various Federal agencies."

In enlarging on his comment that the article by JOSEPH ALSOP is inaccurate in every major respect, Mr. BECKLER observed that the ALSOP article appeared to be based not on access to the Killian Report itself, but rather possibly ALSOP having had access to someone having knowledge of the briefings before the National Security Council or the National Security Council Planning Board with regard to ICBM. In further comment, BECKLER pointed to paragraph number three in the ALSOP article which begins with the sentence, "The basis of this estimate is the expectation that in 1960-1965, . . ." BECKLER stated the Killian Report did not set forth any estimates of time such as the dates 1960 to 1965, and the remainder of paragraph number three in the ALSOP column, according to BECKLER, is generally common knowledge.

BECKLER made reference to the tenth paragraph in the ALSOP article, beginning with, "The committee was given complete access to all the huge mass of information . . ." BECKLER stated this statement to the effect the Committee had twice requested extensions of deadlines was entirely erroneous.

Mr. BECKLER pointed to the fact that in paragraph number twenty and in ensuing paragraphs in the ALSOP news column there was reference to "phases" of time. BECKLER stated the Killian Report did make reference to periods of time and divided such periods into four periods, while ALSOP mentions three "phases." He said it may or may not be significant, but ALSOP did use the word "transitional" to describe one of the "phases," while as a matter of fact, the Killian Report did use the terminology "transitional."

Mr. BECKLER made reference to paragraph number thirty-two in the ALSOP news column, beginning with the sentence, "At present, both the day and night fighters of the

American Air Defense Command are at least obsolescent . . .". Mr. BECKLER stated this paragraph and succeeding paragraphs appeared to be a "re-hash" of prior material which had appeared in previous columns by JOSEPH ALSOP.

Mr. BECKLER concluded that his comments concerning the news column by JOSEPH ALSOP and his answers to the questions posed by Mr. WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice, would be subject to final approval by Dr. ARTHUR S. FLEMING, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization.

On September 21, 1955, Mr. LEE W. SCHOOLER, Information Officer, Office of Defense Mobilization, Room 106, Executive Office Building, advised that no "clearance" for publication had been sought by JOSEPH ALSOP prior to the publishing of the ALSOP article. SCHOOLER advised he had ascertained that on Thursday, September 15, 1955, JOSEPH ALSOP, in the absence of SCHOOLER, had telephonically contacted SCHOOLER's office and made inquiry of his secretary, Miss JOSEPHINE BURNS, as to the identity of the office or officers handling the Killian Report.

Miss BURNS, upon interview, stated that on Thursday afternoon, September 15, 1955, JOSEPH ALSOP telephoned Mr. SCHOOLER's office and Miss BURNS answered the telephone. She said he identified himself as JOSEPH ALSOP and then asked what office was responsible for the preparation of the report by the President's Advisory Scientific Committee. Miss BURNS stated she referred ALSOP to the Science Advisory Committee and to the office of Mr. DAVID Z. BECKLER, Executive Secretary of that Committee.

Mrs. KATHRYN H. BEARD, Secretary to Mr. BECKLER, Room 160, Executive Office Building, stated that on Thursday, September 15, 1955, a girl telephoned Mr. BECKLER's office and Mrs. BEARD answered the call. She said the girl identified herself as being in Mr. ALSOP's office and then inquired for the names of the members of the Science Advisory Committee. Mrs. BEARD stated inasmuch as the names of the Committee members were public information and printed in the Federal Register, she thereupon furnished to the caller the names of the Committee members, as well as their business or

WFO

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ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

This report is classified "~~Secret~~" inasmuch as the written answers to the questions posed by the Department and answered by DAVID Z. BECKLER, ODM, were classified "~~Secret~~."

It is noted that the "Killian Report" referred to by JOSEPH ALSOP and bearing the caption, "The Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee," actually is classified "Top Secret."

REFERENCE: Bureau airtel to Washington Field dated September 19, 1955, with attachment consisting of memorandum, same date, to the Director from WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice.

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE



AIRTEL

12/17/56

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

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b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [REDACTED]

JOSEPH ALSOP  
ESP - X

Enclosed are five copies of a blank memorandum which are self-explanatory. Information furnished on 12/17/56 was furnished by [REDACTED] and information furnished on 12/12/56 was furnished by [REDACTED]

b7D

The above is being furnished to the Bureau for whatever dissemination is deemed appropriate.

LAUGHLIN

*BMA* 3 - Bureau (Encls. 5) Sent 12/17/56  
(3) - WFO  
(1-100-19456) [REDACTED]  
(1 [REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

*Bda*

JLW:ayj  
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AIRTEL

Searched \_\_\_\_\_  
Serialized *70* \_\_\_\_\_  
Indexed \_\_\_\_\_  
Filed *70* \_\_\_\_\_

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

*-10*

*fr*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 21, 1964

JOSEPH W. ALSOP  
INTERNAL SECURITY - [REDACTED]

b7E

A confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised of learning on September 9, 1964, that Joseph Alsop contacted the Hungarian Legation and requested a visa to visit Hungary for a short period sometime between November 1 and December 15, 1964. [REDACTED] b7D

A second confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, learned on September 12, 1964, that the Hungarian Government authorized issuance of a visa to Joseph Alsop to permit travel to Hungary.

A third confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that Joseph Alsop was seeking a visa for travel to Czechoslovakia from November 1 to December 15, 1964. According to the source, [REDACTED] informed Alsop that he would have no trouble in obtaining this visa [REDACTED] b7D

A fourth confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, recently learned that Joseph Alsop arranged to have lunch with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to discuss Alsop's contemplated trip to Rumania. b7D

A fifth confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, learned on September 14, 1964,

5- Bureau [REDACTED] ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5- WFO [REDACTED]  
(1- [REDACTED]) (CHROBOK)  
(1- 100-18807) (BALACEANU)  
(1- [REDACTED])  
(1- 100-382)

b3  
b7E

RFO:cam  
(10)

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Searched [REDACTED]  
Serialized [REDACTED]  
Indexed [REDACTED]  
Filed [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOSEPH W. ALSOP

[REDACTED]  
had been authorized for Joseph Alsop to permit his visit to Poland between November 1 and December 15, 1964.

b7D

The "Diplomatic List" issued by the United States Department of State, under date of February, 1964 denotes that Miloslav Chrobok is the Third Secretary, Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and Petra Balaceanu is Ambassador, Embassy of the Rumanian People's Republic.

The 1962 Polks Washington City Directory denotes that Joseph W. Alsop is a syndicated columnist for the New York Herald Tribune Syndicate.

The 1964-65 issue of "Who's Who in America" denotes that Joseph W. Alsop is a newspaperman and author of a syndicated column on politics. He resides at 2720 Dumbarton Avenue, Washington, D. C.

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
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 09-15-2017 BY J75J65T61 ADG

(Title) JOSEPH ALSOP

(File No)\_

1. Receipt for classified document :(filed 9-30-55 ecs)

**Disposition:**



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